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BIAS IN HOUSING:
TOWARD A NEW APPROACH
Charles E. Ricet
The United States Commission on Civil Rights in their 1959
report observed:
housing .. seems to be the one commodity in the American Market
that is not freely available on equal terms to everyone who can afford
to pay.'
The problem of racial discrimination in housing is the product of
several factors. Among these is racial prejudice on the part of private
land owners, real estate brokers, builders and mortgage finance in-
stitutions.2 The result is a housing market partially closed to minor-
ity groups, especially negroes; a housing market in which the
negroes' dollar does not have purchasing power equal to that of
the whites. This accounts in part for the growing concentrations of
negroes in urban racial enclaves, where they live under unhealthful,
overcrowded conditions which can contribute to increased rates of
crime, disease and disorder. For the negro, whether in or out of
the ghetto, who has the financial capacity and the desire to move
to better quarters, the housing problem is difficult and poignant.
For even if he succeeds in overcoming the wall of prejudice and
enters into a white neighborhood, he will often find that this prejudice
has turned that neighborhood, shortly after his entry, into a pre-
dominantly black one.
Mr. Eugene P. Conser, Executive Vice President of the Na-
tional Association of Real Estate Boards, analyzed well the reasons
why negro integration into a neighborhood so often degenerates into
a negro replacement of residents of other ethnic groups:
The white resident resists Negro encroachment and eventually moves
because: (1) he believes his white neighbors will move sooner or later;(2) he believes that if he remains too long he will not be able to find
a white buyer; (3) he believes that, under the circumstances, property
values will drop; (4) he believes that if he remains his own social
position will be adversely affected; (5) he prefers that his children's
close associates and friends be of the same racial and similar religious
background; (6) he is concerned about intermarriage and the added
t A.B., 1953, College of the Holy Cross; LL.B., 1956, Boston College Law School;LL.M., 1959, J.S.D., 1962, New York University School of Law; Associate Professor,
Fordham University School of Law.
1 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report 534 (1959).2 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Report-Housing at 2-3 (1961).
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problems that it brings; (7) if he can readily move, he chooses that
way out as being preferable. The real estate broker who is charged with
seeking a buyer soon finds that he cannot interest white families except
as the property can be had at a bargain price or terms. Therefore, the
seller easily concludes that his best interests are served by arranging
a sale to a Negro family. And so the process of replacement starts-
and with each sale it continues inexorably until the last white family
moves.
The residents of the "all white suburbs" that have been the subject
of so much critical analysis by some writers have seen this process of
population osmosis occur in building after building, block after block,
neighborhood after neighborhood from which they have moved. They
cannot have any confidence that, once started in their own neighbor-
hood it will not inevitably repeat its historical process. And so they
resist any threatened beginning.
3
The attitude described by Mr. Conser is deep rooted, beyond
the reach of compulsive legislation. If it is to be changed, it will be
done only by the growth of a voluntary consensus built upon the
dictates of religion, morality and common sense. Unfortunately, rash
and precipitate efforts are continually made to compel a surface
integration of neighborhoods through so called fair housing laws and
it is testimony to the depth of the emotions involved here that such
laws have inevitably failed to achieve a durable housing integration
and have aroused instead a popular opposition that is as awesome in
its intensity as it is impressive in extent.
Recent developments in the state of California provide a clear
example. In 1963 the state legislature, after much heated debate and
substantial amending, passed the California Fair Housing Act
(Rumford Act).' The declared policy of the Rumford Act outlaws
discrimination in certain enumerated categories on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry.5 A comment in a recent
edition of the Southern California Law Review provides a good
summary and discussion of the Rumford Act.'
3 CONSER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE REALTOR, NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF REAL
ESTATE BoARDs 9 (1963).
4 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700-35744.
5 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35700.
6 Comment, 37 So. CAL. L. REV. 427 (1964). "... Section 35720 specifies various
categories of persons coming under the Act, summarized as follows:
1. Owners of all dwellings having more than four units.
2. Owners of publicly assisted housing accommodations containing three or
more units.
3. Owners of publicly assisted single family dwellings occupied by the owner.
4. Persons subject to the Unruh Act as it applied to housing accommodations.
5. Persons or financial institutions making loans for the acquisition or con-
struction of housing accommodations.
The acts made unlawful are:
1. Discrimination with regard to sale or lease.
2. Discrimination with regard to terms, conditions, or privileges of such sale
or lease.
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In November of 1964 the voters of California approved by a
margin of 2 to 1 an amendment (Proposition 14) to the state con-
stitution nullifying much of that state's existing laws against racialdiscrimination in the sale or rental of housing.7 Almost immediately
after its passage the new amendment to the state constitution met
with a serious legal challenge on grounds that it is violative of thefourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.8 [Held unconsti-
tutional by the California Supreme Court, May 10, 1966. SeeEditors' case note, page 241.] As a result of this challenge the posi-
tion of the law on housing discrimination in California is very much
in doubt.
The passage of fair housing legislation by the California state
legislature and the subsequent voter rejection by popular referendumis illustrative of a broad national pattern. So-called fair housing laws
have recently been rejected through popular referenda in suchdiverse places as Detroit, Tacoma, Seattle, Akron, Toledo, and
Berkeley, California.' At the same time, there is a counter trend
toward the adoption of fair housing laws by state and local legislativebodies. As of September 15, 1965, at least sixteen states, twenty-nine
cities, the District of Columbia, King County in the State of Wash-ington, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands had adopted such laws to
affect some part of the private housing market. Four more statesprohibited discrimination in some types of publicly-assisted housing,
and at least forty more cities had policy resolutions or regulations
against various types of housing discrimination. In 1965, campaigns
to enact or strengthen fair housing laws were actively waged in
twenty-one states, as against campaigns in only twelve states in1963, the previous record year. These 1965 campaigns were success-ful in at least seven states. And in eight states, opponents of fairhousing laws failed in their efforts to secure legislation to provide
for referenda on the housing question.1l
3. Making oral or written inquiry of race, religion, etc. of the prospective
tenant, purchaser, or borrower.In addition, this section makes unlawful for any person, to aid, abet, incite, compel or
coerce the doing of any of the acts made unlawful ..."
7 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26. The essential provision states: "Neither the State nor
any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly,the right of any person who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all
of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person orpersons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses."8 Mulkey v. Reitman, L.A. No. 28360, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Hill v. Miller,
Sac. No. 7657 Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Peyton v. Barrington Plaza, L.A. No. 28449,Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Thomas v. Goulis, S.F. No. 22019, Cal. Supreme Ct.(1965); Grogan v. Meyer, S.F. No. 22020, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Prendergast v.Snyder, L.A. No. 28422, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); Redevelopment Agency of theCity of Fresno v. Buckman, S.F. No. 22017, Cal. Supreme Ct. (1965); the above
cases were reheard by the California Supreme Court on March 21, 1966.
9 N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1965 § 8 (Review), p. 1, col. 1.10 See Report, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, The FairHousing Statutes and Ordinances as of June 1, 1965. (1965).
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From these counter trends it is fully obvious that the opponents
of fair housing laws are confident of popular support, while the advo-
cates of such laws understandably prefer to work indirectly through
legislatures. The reason for these attitudes is no less obvious.
Parallel with this state activity, the federal executive and Con-
gress have acted to combat racial discrimination in housing. Presi-
dent Kennedy's executive order of November 20, 1962, forbids racial
discrimination in housing financed by loans insured by the Federal
Housing Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administra-
tion." This order is applicable to less than ten percent of federally-
aided housing, old and new.' 2 An extension of this prohibition to
housing financed by federally-insured banks has been proposed.'3
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has the effect, in theory, of
prohibiting racial discrimination in federally-aided public housing,
urban renewal projects and specialized housing for the elderly.' 4 It
should be noted here that, apart from the questionable argument that
federal mortgage or other assistance in the purchase or improvement
of property gives the federal government power to prohibit racial
discrimination in the sale of such property, there is not the slightest
shadow of constitutional justification for a federal law simply pro-
hibiting housing discrimination in general. Yet such a bill is presently
before Congress, providing federal injunctive relief against dis-
crimination in all housing, public and private, down to the smallest
family dwelling.' 5 The housing bill is based upon the Congressional
authority to regulate interstate commerce. In the present era, which
witnesses the bankruptcy of limited, constitutional government, such
a law might well be enacted and upheld by the courts. Let the record
show here an anticipatory protest, based upon the conception that
our founding fathers were wise in respecting the difference in roles
between municipal and federal government.
There are many varieties among the existing fair housing laws
and they are neatly summarized in a report of the National Com-
mittee Against Discrimination in Housing:
The fair housing laws vary widely in their primary coverage of the
housing supply and in provisions for enforcement. Alaska's statute
covers all sales and rentals with no exemptions, and is enforced by a
state human rights commission. New Hampshire on the other hand,
provides no official enforcement machinery for a provision in its public
accommodations law which bars discrimination "in the matter of rental
11 Exec. Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962).
12 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 3.
13 N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec. 15, 1965.
14 Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 601-602, 78 Stat. 252 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000D
(1964).
15 N.Y. Times, March 16, 1966, p. 41, col. 2. See S. 3296, 89th Congress, 2d Session.
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or occupancy of a dwelling in a building containing more than
one dwelling." Among the 15 "private housing" states, only New
Hampshire and Maine provide no official enforcement agencies.
There is also considerable variance in enforcement practices, both un-
der statutory provisions and operating procedures adopted by the
commissions. Some commissions initiate complaints of discrimination
on their own motion; some seek restraining orders from the courts
to hold the housing at issue On the market until the charge of dis-
crimination is investigated and resolved (injunctive relief); some lean
toward a liberal interpretation of anti-discrimination legislation, taking
into account "the intent of the law"; some follow a conservative ap-
proach, adhering rigidly to the "letter of the law."'16
It would be a mistake to focus on the specifics of fair housing
legislation to the neglect of the general principles involved. It is
important to note here that there is no absolute right to own and
dispose of property. Consistent with the Constitution as well as the
moral idea of the stewardship of wealth, the right of property can
be subjected by law to reasonable regulation for the common good.
Thus, one cannot with impunity convert his split-level house into a
glue factory to the discomfort of his neighbors. The opposition to
fair housing laws, then, ought not to be framed in terms of a cate-
gorical defense of an unqualified right of property. Rather, the issue
is the reasonableness and prudence of the proposed regulations. The
problem of discrimination in housing involves more than a mere
mechanical adjustment of human contacts. For it is in the housing
area, more so than in employment, public accommodations and
education, that compulsory laws evoke a truly visceral reaction. Here
the regulation is one of tangible real property which, in the case of a
residence, is not used in business nor devoted to any public use. It is
a form of property, moreover, which has long been regarded as the
hallmark of a man's independence. The tangible and uniquely private
character of the regulated property accounts in part for the vehe-
mence of the popular reaction to fair housing laws. Further, the
opposition springs both from prospective sellers (and, in many cases,
their real estate brokers) who object to the restraint upon their right
of disposition and from the neighbors who resent the curtailment of
their informal power, exercised through a subtle and effective social
pressure, to discourage the sale of property in the neighborhood to
negroes.
The right of disposition is one of the basic incidents of property
ownership, and to the extent a man is deprived of the right to dis-
pose of his property to whomever he chooses, he is to that extent
less an owner than a trustee for the person or government possessing
16 Report, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, The Fair
Housing Statutes and Ordinances as of June 1, 1965, p. 3 (1965).
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the veto over his right of choice. The right to dispose of property is,
of course, not immune from reasonable restriction for the common
good, but it is sufficiently basic that it ought not to be infringed
except for a proportionately serious reason. In order to justify com-
pulsory fair housing laws, the proponents must show not only that
the laws will increase the access of negroes to quality housing, and
will do so without undue curtailment of the rights of others, but also
that voluntary and conciliatory means are incapable of achieving
the desired racial mobility of residence. In short, they must demon-
strate that the laws are reasonably necessary to the promotion of
the common good.
The legitimacy of fair housing laws must be decided with
reference to their impact on would-be sellers of property and upon
the existing neighbors of those sellers. In both respects, the distinc-
tion between morality and legality must be kept in mind. For in-
stance,* while an owner's right to dispose of his property is properly
subject only to a very limited legal restraint, it is quite clear that, at
least in this country at this time, it would be immoral to refuse to
sell or lease property to a prospective buyer or tenant on account of
that person's race. It would violate the prospective buyer's right to be
treated in such a vital matter without regard to his race. For a man
has no control over his race and, whatever his race may be, he is
no less a man because of it. At least in twentieth century America,
this natural moral claim of the buyer ought to be beyond dispute.
This does not include blockbusting, of course, where a few un-
scrupulous real estate agents use negro buyers to promote panic
sales and, thereby, large commissions. In that situation, an owner
might properly refuse to sell, not because the buyer is a negro, but
because he is a blockbuster. Ironically, compulsory fair housing laws
make it easier for those few real estate brokers who would practice
blockbusting, because those laws afford them a ready pretense and
cover for the artificial introduction of prospective negro purchasers
into a neighborhood where their introduction is likely to precipitate
panic selling by white residents."
But while racial discrimination in housing is immoral, it does
not necessarily follow that it ought to be illegal. Obviously, the issues
posed here are ones of balance and prudence and are not resolved by
sweeping moralisms about the evil of racial discrimination. They
reduce themselves in concrete situations to the wisdom and necessity
of specific proposals in specific places and times. There are rational
arguments on either side and, quite clearly; there is room for differ-
17 Conser, Human Rights and the Realtor, National Association of Real Estate
Boards 10 (1963).
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ence of opinion here among reasonable men who share a common
opposition to racial discrimination. Unfortunately, there is a ten-dency among the advocates of racial legislation to slide too often
from an affirmation of general moral principles to an uncritical asser-
tion that particular laws are clear dictates of those principles. In the
wake of the California voters' endorsement of Proposition 14, erasing
much of that state's legislation against housing discrimination (in-
cluding the so-called Rumford Law), one Los Angeles priest rebuked
those clergy who too readily summoned the Pope as an authorityfor their political arguments in this matter. Father O'Reilly's point is
important enough for an extensive quote:
This brings me to my final point, which is, to register a protest against
the many priest writers who during the course of the campaign filled
the mails with trash masquerading as theology. It was not their ad-
vocacy of a "No" on 14 that was offensive, but the way in which they
sought to bully the consciences of the laity by a dishonest appeal to
moral grounds. Instead of attempting a reasoned application of princi-
ples of law and government to the situation, the writers pounded ad
nauseam on the evils of discrimination, shouting that this was a moralissue on which the Church had spoken. Indeed it was a moral issue,
but a moral issue of lawmaking and its limits, for which Catholic
thought provides no ready answers, but instead, a principle of balance.
To insist otherwise was to play "politics" with religion.
It is interesting to note that Cardinal McIntyre, upon whom so much
criticism has been heaped for his failure to come out publicly on the
side of a "No" vote, seems to have a sounder grasp of Catholic thought
than many of his 6ritics. Having drawn attention to the clear state-
ments of the Bishops of the United States on the moral evil of dis-
crimination, having urged his priests to preach justice and charity,
having declared the diocesan policy to continue moving toward greaterintegration in schools and institutions of the Church, he refused to
commit himself publicly on the subject of lawmaking about dis-
crimination. Since Catholic principles of jurisprudence are not rigidlyin favor of laws, but speak also on the side of liberty, the Cardinal
rightly left the choice to the individual consciences of Catholics. Thefact that some of them might use this freedom to vote away Rumford-
type laws just in order to continue violations against justice or charity
in the sale of property would not be a valid reason for taking thatfreedom from them. Incidentally, the Cardinal was the first to point
out publicly, as soon as the amendment had been passed, that the "Yes"
vote on Proposition 14 did not make any change in the obligation
arising out of the natural moral law of justice and charity. Such a state-
ment, though obvious in another day, is clearly necessary in an age in
which statutes and coercion tend to usurp the functions of conscience
and cooperation, even in the minds of priests.18
What, then, are we to say about fair housing laws? As in other
racial matters, the proper goal here is the promotion of color blind-
ness and the discouragement of color consciousness. In fact, in
iS O'Reilly, Conscience and Law in California, AvE MAarA 8, Feb. 20, 1965.
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housing the need of color blindness is even greater than in other
areas, owing to the personal and prolonged character of the neigh-
borhood relationship. Housing laws which impose penalties for
conduct which an administrative tribunal and the courts happen to
find, after the fact, to be racially discriminatory, ironically tend to
accentuate racial differences and impede the development of the
color blind consensus which is a prerequisite to enduring progress
in housing matters. Seen from another aspect, they are an unreason-
able restriction upon the owner's right to dispose of his property.
They are unreasonable, for one thing, because they do not work to
achieve their avowed aim of integration. Rather, they tend to ac-
celerate the process of replacement of ethnic groups in a neighbor-
hood. They are unreasonable on another count because they im-
prudently seek to exorcise, by coercion, deeply rooted feelings and
instincts, and in so doing they move along a course which leads to
grotesque and intolerable restrictions upon freedom of action. For
fair housing laws cannot themselves change the attitudes underlying
the chain reaction which causes neighborhood integration to become
neighborhood replacement. If anything, such laws are only going to
intensify that reaction. The result is, that if those laws are ever
going to achieve their aim of neighborhood integration, they must be
equipped with teeth to stem the tide of escaping whites. Those teeth
must include the power to enjoin whites from selling to negroes, and
to enjoin negroes from buying from whites, in a neighborhood which
is nearing the "tipping point" beyond which it becomes irresistibly
and totally negro. Only in this way can the coercive law succeed in
maintaining neighborhood integration, and only thus can the power
of the state prevent the steady osmosis by which neighborhoods,
block by block, change color from all white to all black. In this way,
too, one could be literally imprisoned in his neighborhood. And, of
course, in such an extension of the so-called fair housing laws, the
state would undertake to be the jailer of the people. In truth of
course, the only way that free integration, as opposed to total
replacement, can be achieved is through a regeneration of attitude,
drawing upon religious and moral principles. In the development of
such an attitude, compulsory fair housing laws are worse than irrele-
vant. They are positively harmful.
There are other objections that could be raised at length to
compulsory fair housing laws. They are difficult of enforcement and
lend themselves to a breadth of administrative discretion that is
exceedingly subject to abuse. Also, it is not wholly incidental that
they afford an opportunity for blackmail; a homeowner; having
already contracted to buy another house and therefore being under
pressure to sell his own house, might favorably consider "paying off"
an unscrupulous member of a minority race as the price for prevent-
19661
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ing that person from lodging a protest with an official housing com-
mittee which could obtain an injunction against the sale of the house
pending investigation, which injunction would take the seller's house
off the market for what could be a lengthy period of time. New York
law is just one example of fair housing legislation that allows such
an injunction and also permits the awarding of compensatory dam-
ages to a person discriminated against, and to a person accused if
he is found innocent of the discrimination and suffers losses as
a result of the unfounded accusation made against him.19 The New
York City Commission on Human Rights has even more power
than the State Commission, in that the City agency can, without
obtaining a court order and based on the Commission's own find-
ing of "probable cause" of discrimination, post a notice on the
door of the premises for ten days. The notice would say that "pro-
spective transferees will take said accommodations at their peril"
because the quarters are the subject of a complaint.2 ° In California,
the Rumford Act also has a provision allowing such an injunction. 1
Despite the inherently limited capacity of compulsive law in
racial matters, there is room for some governmental intervention in
the housing area. Whatever else may be said of fair housing laws,
they do provide an excuse to the realtor who is personally willing to
show homes to negro purchasers but who would fear to do so, in the
absence of a law, for fear of retaliation by some of his white clients.
Now he can justify his showing of homes to negroes by the fact that
the law forbids him to do otherwise. There is no reason, however,
why this and any other desirable fruits of fair housing laws could
not be obtained through a conciliatory law without compulsory sanc-
tions. It is true that serious consideration should be given to work-
able laws, with teeth, to prevent "blockbusting" by unscrupulous real
estate brokers and to prevent serious harassments of persons who
sell or buy homes on an interracial basis. The state licensing agencies
in Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania have regulations under
which real estate brokers or salesmen are liable to revocation or sus-
pension of their licenses if they engage in "blockbusting" tactics.22
At least fifteen cities have ordinances prohibiting "blockbusting" or
other promotion of panic sales." But on the point of compelling or
prohibiting the sale itself, the law should content itself with concilia-
tion at the lowest level of government. A local government agency
charged with the duty to conciliate interracial housing disputes; with
19 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297.
20 N.Y. CiTy ADMm. CODE, ch. 1, §§ B.1-8.0(2).
21 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 35734.
22 Report, National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing, The Fair
Housing Statutes and Ordinances as of June 1, 1965, p. 8 (1965).
23 Id. at 9.
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appropriate publicity but with no power to compel or forbid, offers
a prospect of redirecting the housing effort from the path of indis-
criminate and self-defeating compulsion onto the more promising
road toward a genuinely voluntary consensus.
Such a non-compulsive commission could play a leading role in
the basic job of education which must be done here. It is sometimes
claimed that compulsory laws in the housing and other areas have an
educative effect, in accustoming people to acting in a non-discrimina-
tory manner, with the result that they eventually come to give
internal assent to the standards initially imposed upon them by the
coercive law. This may be so. But there is no sufficient reason why
this task of education could not be performed more effectively by an
adequate conciliatory commission of the sort described here with-
out exacting a prohibitive toll in restricted freedom. If it be objected
that it will take a long time to achieve the goal of color blindness
in this way, let it be said in reply that the goal will never be reached
by the coercive route. Until the prevalent attitudes are changed-and
they can be changed, not by compulsion but only by the growth of
a voluntary consensus-integration will continue to yield to replace-
ment and the ghetto will merely be transplanted and not transformed.
Voluntary fair housing committees, such as exist in some com-
munities, can play an important part in this educational process by
dispelling the prevailing misconception that integration necessarily
leads to a deterioration in property values and by enlisting the affir-
mative cooperation of residents who pledge to resist the tendency to
panic selling.24 In a related vein, Representative Donald Fraser (D.,
Minn.) has set up a National Committee on Tithing in Investment,
to encourage private capital investment in the construction of inter-
racial housing projects.25 Here, too, the National Urban League
offers a constructive aid in publishing free registries of homes and
apartments which the owners are personally willing to sell without
regard to race.26 These and other voluntary efforts are essential and
their occurrence is encouraging. A great deal can be done by churches
in furthering the formation of sound moral attitudes, an activity less
dramatic and thrilling than the picket line, but far more effective.
We need, in short, to dispel the prevalent infatuation with coercion as
a universal remedy, and to redirect the primary effort into voluntary
and constructive channels.
24 See Faber, I'm Not Against it, But-, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1963, § 6
(Magazine) p. 58. On the prevalent misconceptions concerning deterioration of
property values, see, Palmore and Howe, Residential Integration and Property Values,
Social Problems 52 (1962).
25 See column of William F. Buckley, Jr., New York Journal American, March 4,
1965.
26 N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1965, p. 13, col. 7.
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